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Abstract
This essay summarizes some recent empirical contributions on two aspects
of sharecropping: (i) the e⁄ects of the contractual form (incentive power and
contract length) on resource allocation and farm performance; and (ii) the
exogenous elements behind the choice of di⁄erent contractual forms.
1 Introduction
Insurance is a term used to describe both formal and informal arrangements
designed to mitigate the risk of harmful events. Risk has always been a major
human concern and many practices in primitive tribes can be seen as insurance
mechanisms. This essay discusses some recent empirical papers on one of these
ancient insurance mechanisms, sharecropping, which is used to share the risk posed
by nature to agricultural activities.
Sharecropping is a form of land leasing in which a tenant and landlord share
the ￿nal output as compensation for the managerial labor supplied by the former
and the land capital supplied by the latter. This contract has been used through-
out time since ancient societies and is still in use in modern economies. For in-
stance, Warriner (1962), Hodkinson (1992), and Huson (2000) describe the use of
this system in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Greece; Ho⁄man (1984) notes a
dramatic expansion of sharecropping in France between the Middle Ages and the
17th century; Ackerberg and Botticini (2000) present an empirical analysis of the
risk-sharing properties of sharecropping in early Renaissance Tuscany; and Canjels
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1(1998b) and Allen and Lueck (2003) discuss the importance of this contractual form
in the present organization of the farming sector in the USA.
Classical View
Agriculture has been a major element in economic thought since the Phys-
iocrats,1 but Adam Smith was one of the ￿rst classical authors to extensively com-
ment on the incentive aspects of the sharecropping practice.2 In the ￿rst volume of
the Wealth of Nations, Smith discussed the discouragement of agriculture in Europe
and strongly stressed the lack of incentives inherent in the sharecropping system.
Sharecropping tenants (or metayers) bear most of the input costs (especially labor
ones) and receive only a fraction of the ￿nal output. This induces them to undersup-
ply these inputs. Furthermore, tenure insecurity reduces their incentive to improve
the land. In Adam Smith￿ s words:
￿To the slave cultivators of ancient times, gradually succeeded a species of
farmers known at present in France by the name of Metayers. [...] It could
never, however, be to the interest even of this last species of cultivators to lay
out, in further improvement of the land, any part of the little stock which they
might save from their own share of the produce, because the lord, who laid out
nothing, was to get one-half of whatever is produced.￿ (Adam Smith, 1776,
Book II, Chapter II, pp. 412 and 414)
Smith￿ s point of view has in￿ uenced many other classical authors. John Stuart
Mill (1848) wrote:
￿The metayer has less motive to exertion than the peasant proprietor, since
only half the fruits of his industry, instead of a whole, are his own.￿ (John
Stuart Mill, 1848, Book II, Chapter VIII, pp. 304)
But Mill also acknowledges the existence of mechanisms available to landlords
to mitigate the sharecropping ine¢ ciency. After mentioning the very critical view
of Anne R.J. Turgot, Arthur Young, John R. McCulloch, Richard Jones, and M.
Destutt de Tracy, Mill describes the view of M. de Sismondi (a landowner from
Tuscany) defending the metayer system for protecting tenants from land disputes
with their neighbors￿ such disputes would be part of the landlord￿ s responsibilities.
The fact that di⁄erent generations of the same family live as tenants on some lands
is also mentioned as being able to reduce the problems caused by tenure insecurity.
In line with Adam Smith￿ s view, Alfred Marshall (1890) wrote:
1See, for instance, Quesnay (1758).
2Other contemporaneous authors (such as Anne R.J. Turgot) have also analyzed this practice
in similar lines.
2￿For, when the cultivator has to give to his landlord half of the returns to each
dose of capital and labor that he applies to the land, it will not be to his interest
to apply any doses the total return to which is less than twice enough to reward
him.￿ (Alfred Marshall, 1890, Book VI, Chapter IX, pp. 644)
However, Marshall also acknowledges that the sharecropping technical ine¢ -
ciency would be mitigated if the tenants￿actions were costlessly monitored.
In a di⁄erent perspective, Karl Marx (1894) condemned sharecropping, consid-
ering it a feudal institution incompatible with capitalism. Curiously, the idea of
a noble landlord leasing lands to poor farmers in order to avoid being involved in
productive activities does not seem to ￿t in a dynamic capitalist system, but the
idea of an absentee shareholder hiring a manager to run a company became a main
characteristic of modern capitalism.
In spite of the disadvantages listed by classical economists, the sharecropping
lease remained in use throughout the Old World and became even more popular in
the New World. Intriguingly, share contracts in the 20th century tended to have a
short duration, contrary to the classical arguments for tenure stability. Noticing this
fact, D. Gale Johnson (1950) stressed an important incentive aspect of short-term
leases: they must be frequently renewed. Moving is costly for tenants and landlords
tend to renew contracts based on relative performance (i.e., by comparing the pro-
ductivity of sharecropped farms with those of similar lands owned or leased under
￿xed rent). Repeated contracting could induce sharecropping tenants to supply the
appropriate amount of labor and other inputs. Furthermore, the landlord should be
willing to pay for land-speci￿c investments, which alter the long-term productivity
of the land and, therefore, its rental price. Under these premises, sharecropping
generates no loss of e¢ ciency in resource allocation. In Johnson￿ s words:
￿With a short-term lease renters are obviously aware that landlords have the
alternative of renting their land for a cash rent independent of current output.
Consequently, the tenant must plan to produce an average output per acre that
will provide a rental payment, if yields are average, equal to the possible cash
rent plus any additional payment required to compensate the landlord for the
uncertainty that he bears. [...] Once he has found a farm, he may fear that
his lease will not be renewed unless su¢ cient rent is actually paid.￿ (D. Gale
Johnson, 1950, pp. I20)
Modern Theory
From Adam Smith to D. Gale Johnson, the debate was mainly concentrated
on the sharecropping incentives for proper allocation of resources. Cheung (1969)
shifted the focus of the discussion towards the insurance properties of sharecrop-
3ping.3 He argued that e¢ cient resource allocation would be obtained whenever
landlords were able to monitor tenants￿activities. Under this premise, sharecrop-
ping is presented as an e¢ cient way of sharing the production risk between landlords
and tenants. In equilibrium, the share of risk borne by landlords and tenants would
be determined by the di⁄erence in their level of risk aversion.4
In 1974, Joseph E. Stiglitz published an in￿ uential analysis of the sharecropping
problem. Share contracts were viewed as the optimal solution for an insurance
problem in a scenario with moral hazard. Tenants usually choose privately observed
variables that a⁄ect productivity, and the optimal share rate should balance the
incentives for exerting this hidden e⁄ort and the costs of risk bearing. The works by
Stiglitz (1974), Holmstrom (1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), and Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987) showed that the optimal tenancy contract should balance incentives
and insurance in environments with moral hazard. Similar to the predictions of
Adam Smith and other classical authors, sharecropping would in fact not induce
the maximum output per unit of land. However, this productivity loss would be
compensated by the welfare gain of sharing risk.
By connecting the early discussion of resource allocation with Cheung￿ s analysis
of optimal contract design, the literature on moral hazard set the basis for our mod-
ern understanding of tenancy contracts. This literature together with the works on
asymmetric information developed by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), and Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) became the core of modern insurance theory.
However, insurance and incentives are not the only motives raised in the eco-
nomic literature to explain the design of tenancy contracts. Rao (1971) and Prender-
gast (2002) argue that the value of managerial e⁄ort and entrepreneurial activities
is much higher in risky environments. Risky farms should then be rented under con-
tracts with high incentive power (i.e., contracts in which a high share of the output
is retained by the tenant). This prediction is in sharp contrast with those based
on insurance. In a di⁄erent vein, part of the literature stresses the importance of
labor market imperfections to the choice of tenancy contracts￿ see Otsuka, Chuma,
Hayami (1992) for an extensive discussion on this topic and Ray (1999) for a re-
cent contribution. Furthermore, the literature on transaction costs lists a number of
di⁄erent features that can a⁄ect the contract choice. For instance, negotiations to
determine the rental price in a ￿xed-rent contract can destroy trust between the par-
ties, since landlords usually have better information about the land (see Williamson,
1979 and Murrell, 1983). Also, nonlinear supervision costs can explain systematic
variation in the incidence of share contracts (see Alston, Datta, and Nugent, 1984);
and costs for measuring the ￿nal output tend to discourage share contracts (see
Allen and Lueck, 1992).
New aspects of the agency problem have been pointed out recently. Eswaran and
3Higgs (1894) had already suggested that sharecroppers face more stable income than owner
farmers, but Cheung (1969) was the ￿rst to use insurance to explain the design of share contracts.
4See also Cheung (2002).
4Kotwal (1985) and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) model the environment
where the landlord also exerts productive activities.5 In this case, sharecropping
would not only share the risk between the two parties, but also provide incentives for
both of them. For this reason, share contracts promote better allocation of resources
than ￿xed-rent contracts in the presence of double-sided moral hazard. La⁄ont and
Matoussi (1995) stress that, when dealing with a poor and credit-constrained tenant,
sharing the output might be the only way the landlord has to extract the tenant￿ s
surplus. Hence, the sharecropping technical ine¢ ciency would be related to the
lack of enforceable mechanisms available to the principal to extract the tenant￿ s
surplus. Sengupta (1997) and Ghatak and Pandey (2000) show that sharecropping
is the optimal tenancy contract in environments with limited liability in which the
tenant controls the average productivity and the riskiness of the farm￿ since limited
liability makes the tenant￿ s willingness to take risk be increasing in the contract￿ s
incentive power.
Some other aspects related to Johnson￿ s (1950) analysis were also recently for-
malized. For instance, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983)
show that compensation schemes based on relative performance can in fact alleviate
incentive problems in environments with shocks that are common to all tenants.
Moreover, eviction threats provide incentives for actions a⁄ecting the current rev-
enue and, as shown by Banerjee and Ghatak (2004), there are scenarios in which
these threats also induce long-term investment. Repeated contracting is another tool
used to improve the e¢ ciency of resource allocation in lands under sharecropping.
First-best e¢ ciency is approximately achievable in environments where contracting
agreements are in￿nitely repeated and tenants are su¢ ciently patient, as shown by
Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) and Radner (1985). In ￿nite-horizon settings, Lambert
(1983) and Rogerson (1985) show that the optimal ￿nite-horizon dynamic contract
is history dependent and provides intertemporal insurance for the tenants, but also
imposes some risk on them within each period, similarly to Holmstrom (1979). How-
ever, ￿rst-best results could also be approximated in ￿nite-horizon scenarios if one
works with the epsilon-equilibrium concept de￿ned by Radner (1981).
All these theoretical advances have raised the sophistication level of the debate
about sharecropping, making empirical investigation even more crucial to test the
relevance of each argument. Recently, the availability of well-built databases as well
as the development of new identi￿cation strategies have brought some light to the
debate. This essay is intended to discuss some of these contributions.
There are many comprehensive surveys of land contracts￿ see Otsuka and Hayami
(1988); Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992); Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder
(1995); Deininger and Feder (1997); among others. This essay instead focuses on
recent empirical contributions regarding two particular aspects of this debate: (i)
the e⁄ects of the contractual form (incentive power and contract length) on resource
5Reid (1977) argued that landlords supply managerial advice to sharecroppers.
5allocation and farm performance; and (ii) the exogenous elements behind the choice
of di⁄erent contractual forms. Some empirical articles and working papers on these
two topics, written in the last decade, have been selected to be discussed here. A
few classic papers are also included in order to provide a perspective of the current
trends. An advantage of this strategy is that, by narrowing the focus of the essay,
one is able to provide a more extensive presentation of the selected papers.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the em-
pirical research on resource allocation. This section is divided into two subsections:
one comparing the impact of di⁄erent share rates on input use and farm produc-
tivity; and another studying the e⁄ects of tenure stability on land improvements.
Section 3 presents papers testing di⁄erent arguments raised to explain the design of
tenancy contracts. The essay is then concluded with a brief summary discussing a
few policy implications.
2 Resource Allocation
The main elements of tenancy contracts are: (i) the contract incentive power
(described by the share of the ￿nal output retained by the tenant and the shares of
di⁄erent input costs borne by the tenant); and (ii) the contract length.
Share contracts display lower incentive power than ownership and ￿xed-rent
contracts, since sharecropping tenants receive only a fraction of the total output
and fully bear the costs of many inputs￿ even when the landlord shares the costs
of observed inputs, the tenant still bears the e⁄ort cost of managerial activities. In
the absence of dynamic incentives and threats, farmers under share contracts would
underuse those inputs whose costs are not shared with the landlord. Consequently,
their farms would be less productive. The ￿rst subsection here presents empirical
papers addressing this topic.
Furthermore, since sharecropping and ￿xed-rent tenants face uncertainty of
tenure security, fear of expropriation would lead them to make suboptimal levels
of noncontractible long-term investments. Note that this issue is not exclusive to
sharecropping. In many developing countries, even owners and tenured tenants fear
expropriation due to land reforms. Hence, at some level, this issue is related to a
broader debate about property rights. Nevertheless, for completeness, a few papers
on this subject are presented in Section 2.2.
2.1 Incentive Power
This subsection studies the e⁄ects of incentive power on input use and farm pro-
ductivity. It starts with the paper by Rao (1971), which contains an investigation
of the productivity di⁄erence between owner-operated and share-rented farms in
India. The results are not conclusive; owner-operated farms produce more output
per acre, but sharecroppers are more productive than owners when farm-size level
6is held constant. In another important work, Shaban (1987) uses data from the In-
ternational Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), in India, to
study di⁄erences in resource allocation across owned and sharecropped lands culti-
vated by the same farmer. He ￿nds that farmers are more productive and use inputs
more intensively on their own lands, suggesting the existence of incentive problems.
Next, La⁄ont and Matoussi (1995) theorize that, under limited liability, poor share-
croppers would tend to retain a lower fraction of the output and, thus, exert less
e⁄ort and be less productive. They provide evidence from Tunisia supporting their
theory.
The last work presented here, Braido (2004a), suggests that the incentive prob-
lems measured by comparing land productivity and input use across farms under
di⁄erent contracts can be biased by land-quality heterogeneity. In situations where
land quality is not randomly distributed across di⁄erent contracts, one must be care-
ful when interpreting di⁄erences in the per acre value of each input used and output
produced. Typically, tenants cultivate lands with lower value, which directly reduces
their productivity as well as the marginal return of each input. Hence, the fact that
sharecroppers are less productive and employ lower amounts of each input does not
necessarily imply the existence of shirking behavior. This paper uses ICRISAT data
to revisit Shaban￿ s conclusions from this new perspective. The results raise some
doubts over the belief that sharecroppers shirk systematically.
Rao, J.P.E., 1971 ￿ Part I
An important part of Rao￿ s paper refers to optimal contract design and is left
to Section 2. Here, I present another investigation carried out in that paper (pp.
588) testing the average productivity di⁄erence between owner-operated and share-
rented farms. The work uses farm-level data from the Studies in Economics of Farm
Management in India. In this part of the paper, the author uses 137 observations
from two di⁄erent cropping years, 1957-58 and 1958-59, in ten di⁄erent villages
(seven of them in the rice zone and three in the tobacco zone).
The author argues that land quality (measured by imputed values of land re-
sources) and other inputs are highly correlated. Hence, he estimates a Cobb-Douglas
production function where land quality is the only independent variable (capturing
the joint e⁄ect of land quality and other inputs).
The results are ambiguous. Output per acre is higher in the owner-operated ￿elds
than in share-rented farms, but observed land quality explains around 90 percent of
this variation. Moreover, the elasticity coe¢ cients indicate the existence of dimin-
ishing marginal productivity among owner-operated plots and constant marginal
productivity under sharecropping. Rao then estimates the e⁄ect of the contract on
the average per acre output at each farm-size level, and unlike before, the productiv-
ity is higher in sharecropped lands than in owner-operated farms of corresponding
sizes.
7Shaban, J.P.E., 1987
This work tests two theoretical models of sharecropping: the Marshallian ap-
proach versus Cheung￿ s monitoring approach. The Marshallian approach assumes a
prohibitively high cost of monitoring the tenant￿ s activities. Non-monitored farmers
tend to use inputs less intensively in their sharecropped lands relative to their owned
lands. Consequently, this leads to a lower output per acre in sharecropped farms.
The monitoring approach, on the other hand, theorizes that if landlords accessed an
e⁄ective and inexpensive monitoring technology, they would stipulate all relevant
actions to be followed by tenants. In this scenario, there would be no misallocation
associated with sharecropping.
The empirical investigation uses farm-level data from the ICRISAT￿ s Village
Level Studies, which contain detailed farming information from eight villages in In-
dia. The database contains a subsample of sharecroppers who simultaneously own
and sharecrop di⁄erent ￿elds, allowing one to control for household heterogeneity.
Shaban compares the average per acre values of the output produced and the dif-
ferent inputs used across owned and sharecropped lands of the same household.
Higher output and input intensities on owned land would support the Marshallian
approach, while equal values for owned and sharecropped lands would favor Che-
ung￿ s monitoring approach.
The results indicate signi￿cant di⁄erences. Controlling for irrigation, plot value,
and some observed soil characteristics, one ￿nds that the per acre output is higher by
16.3 percent on owned lands relative to sharecropped lands of the same household.
Farmers also use signi￿cantly more of each input on each acre of their owned farms.
La⁄ont and Matoussi, Rev. Econ. Stud., 1995 ￿ Part I
This paper develops a model of sharecropping with the objective of explaining
contracts observed in El Oulja, a rural area of Tunisia. The key aspect of the
model is the presence of ￿nancial constraints that limit the tenants￿ability to pay
up front rents and invest in productive inputs. Thus, ￿xed-rent contracts, which
induce appropriate levels of e⁄ort, might not be feasible for landlords dealing with
poor tenants. In their theory, share contracts have the function of providing e⁄ort
incentives and solving ￿nancial constraints. They show that the share of the product
retained by the tenant, the level of e⁄ort exerted, and the output produced are
decreasing in the tenant￿ s working capital.
These predictions are tested using data collected with the help of the Tunisian
National Institute of Statistics in 1986 from the rural area of El Oulja, Tunisia.6
The empirical part can be divided into two subparts: one studying productivity
across contracts and another one investigating the determinants of contract design.
Here I focus on the productivity discussion, leaving the part on contract choice for
Section 2.
6A later data collection was carried out in 1988, but as the authors do not seem to trust these
more recent data, they are used only to test the robustness of the results.
8The database contains information on the general characteristics of 100 fami-
lies (including wealth and income) and detailed farming information on each plot
operated by these families (including plot size, type of crop, tenancy status, and
production and input levels). The authors estimate a log-linear production function
using output (per hectare) as the dependent variable. The control variables include
the amount of hired labor, family labor, and other inputs (evaluated per hectare)
and dummies for the contractual characteristics￿ namely, two dummy variables de-
scribing the contract form (sharecropping versus owner or ￿xed rent) and, for share-
cropping contracts, a variable describing the number of months of the relationship
between the landlord and the sharecropper. They acknowledge the fact that the
contract is endogenous and attempt to solve potential endogeneity biases by means
of instrumental variables. They claim that the type of crop (e.g., tomato, potato,
melon, vegetable), the tenant￿ s wealth, and the number of active members in the
family are good instruments for the contractual characteristics. For that to be true,
these variables should be correlated to the tenancy contract and not correlated to
unobserved features a⁄ecting output. The IV estimates for the contract-dummies
coe¢ cients are similar (namely, 4.8 for ￿xed rent and 4.4 for sharecropping￿ see
pp. 391), but statistically di⁄erent from each other. Since the coe¢ cients of the
contract dummies measure the impact of each contract on expected output, this
result suggests that sharecroppers exert less e⁄ort than ￿xed-rent tenants. It is also
found that, in sharecropped ￿elds, productivity is positively related to the number
of months of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Braido, Mimeo, 2004a
Land characteristics vary considerably across farms under di⁄erent tenancy sta-
tus. Typically, lands leased out to tenants (under sharecropping or ￿xed rent)
have lower quality than those cultivated by the owners. Some authors argue that
good lands are cultivated by owners because they display larger scope for soil
exploitation￿ see, for instance, the papers by Allen and Lueck (1992 and 1993)
and Dubois (2002) discussed in Section 3.
Most of the literature on incentive power compares the amount of di⁄erent inputs
used and output produced (evaluated per unit of land) across ￿elds under di⁄erent
contracts. However, in the presence of land heterogeneity, comparing quantities (or
values) is not a valid procedure to test the existence of incentive problems. It is
usually optimal to use inputs less intensively on lands with lower quality, and this
relationship is not necessarily linear (as assumed by Shaban, 1987) or log-linear (as
assumed by Rao, 1971). Furthermore, many land characteristics are privately ob-
served and so not available in the data. Thus, whenever sharecropping is associated
with lower-quality lands, these farms will naturally employ inputs less intensively
and be less productive (even after controlling linearly or log-linearly for observed
land characteristics).
Braido (2004a) acknowledges this fact and use the ICRISAT￿ s Village Level
9Studies (India) to revisit the incentive-power analysis from this perspective.7 In




where i indexes the plots in a certain period, yi represents the output produced
per unit of land; Ai is a productivity factor related to observed land quality; ki
represents all inputs used per unit of land; ￿ 2 (0;1); and "i is an error term
accounting for productive shocks as well as for hidden actions (such as managerial
e⁄ort) and unobserved characteristics of landlords, tenants, and lands.
De￿ne ￿i = E
￿p
r exp("i) j Ii
￿
, where p and r represent the prices for yi and ki
(respectively), and Ii is the information set available to the farmer cultivating plot
i. Notice that ￿i is not constant across plots due to di⁄erentiated information about
characteristics of landlords, tenants, lands, and expected prices and shocks.
For general production functions, pro￿t-maximization conditions establish an
implicit relationship between ki and Ai￿i. For the Cobb-Douglas, this relationship




A few important features are worth noticing from (2). First, lower land quality
(Ai) implies lower input use and thus lower output per unit of land. Second, even
minor di⁄erences in land quality (Ai) may signi￿cantly impact productivity (yi),
since this e⁄ect is ampli￿ed through input choices.
Under a Cobb-Douglas technology, the pro￿t-maximizing input choice would
make ln(ki) and ln(Ai) colinear if and only if ￿i were constant across plots (i.e.,
￿i = ￿). In this case, one could ignore inputs when estimating the reduced form of
(1). However, there are reasons for ￿i to vary across plots, so that ignoring inputs
(ki) introduces a serious problem in the estimation of (1).
The paper then proceeds in the following manner. First, it tests the e⁄ect of
the contract form on productivity when observed land quality and input choices are
used as control variables. The results show that the entire productivity gap across
contracts is explained by di⁄erences in input use. This could be due to the fact
that tenants shirk in their input choices or that these choices re￿ ect land-quality
heterogeneity. One must then test whether input choices were distorted.
The paper notices that yi and ki do not di⁄er across contracts in villages where
the average land quality is homogeneous across plots under di⁄erent contracts. This
supports the idea of di⁄erences in quantities being driven by di⁄erences in land
quality. Next, a structural approach is developed to test the existence of technical
ine¢ ciencies in the input choices.
7See also Braido (2002).
10If inputs were chosen in order to maximize pro￿ts, the marginal productivity of
each factor should be the same across farms under di⁄erent tenancy contracts, re-
gardless of the unobserved characteristics of the land, the tenant, the landlord, and
the environment. In this sense, a test procedure based on the marginal productivity
of each input is free of selection problems. Moreover, when the production function
is Cobb-Douglas, the marginal productivity is easily measured by ￿
yi
ki. The empir-
ical results for the ICRISAT data do not reject the hypothesis that the marginal
productivity of labor and nonlabor inputs are constant across plots under ownership,
￿xed rent, and sharecropping.
2.2 Contract Length
The review here begins with the paper by Besley (1995), which studies the re-
lation between land-speci￿c investments and property rights in Ghana. The results
support the hypothesis that land rights and investments are positively correlated.
This ￿nding is indirectly related to tenure status since, like better-de￿ned property
rights, tenure stability avoids expropriation of long-run investments. The second
paper discussed, Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002), uses a very unique quasi-
experiment to study the e⁄ect of land tenure on resource allocation. The authors
use an exogenous change in property rights in West Bengal that increased tenure
stability of tenants and subsequently increased the incentive power of tenancy con-
tracts and the lands￿average productivity.8 The next paper discussed, Jacoby, Li,
and Rozelle (2002), uses a statistical procedure to estimate the plot-level hazard
of expropriation and shows that this measure is positively correlated to the use of
organic fertilizer in China. Also, Manyong and HoundØkon (2000) ￿nd that land
tenure was positively related to the adoption of a new resource management system
in Benin Republic (West Africa); Jacoby and Mansuri (2003) suggest that owned
lands tend to receive more speci￿c investments than leased lands in Pakistan; and
Bandiera (2004) shows that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow trees in
combination with annual crops in their owned lands (as opposed to leased lands).
Besley, J.P.E., 1995
This work examines the correlation between investment and land rights in Ghana.
The author lists three possible channels driving this correlation. First, land rights
would a⁄ect investments through fear of expropriation. Second, better-de￿ned
land rights may facilitate land being collateralized, reducing interest rates faced
by landowners and increasing land investments. Finally, there is a link between in-
vestment and land rights through gains from trade. Superior land rights improve the
market for selling and renting the land. This ampli￿es the e⁄ects of new investment
on the land￿ s price and rent, increasing the incentives to invest.
8Note that this paper links the exogenous change in the tenure status to the contract￿ s incentive
power. Consequently, it is also related to the topic of the previous subsection.
11The empirical analysis is based on farm-level data from two regions of Ghana,
namely Wassa and Anloga. The main product grown in Wassa is cocoa and the only
signi￿cant investment made to improve the land is planting tree crops. In Anloga,
most agriculture is devoted to growing shallots (a type of small onion) and land
improvements are much more diverse than in Wassa. The database contains: (i)
information on land and household characteristics; (ii) a binary variable indicating
whether land investments were made or not; and (iii) discrete variables describing
household rights on each operated ￿eld. There is signi￿cant variation in property
rights as a consequence of Ghana￿ s transition from a traditional system (where land
ownership was communal and controlled by a tribal chief) to a more modern system
that emphasizes individual claims. These rights fall into twelve categories: rights
to sell, rent, gift, mortgage, pledge, and bequeath, each of them with or without
lineage approval. In many parts of the paper, property rights are aggregated into
two categories: number of rights with and without need of approval.
The author starts by investigating the relationship between investment and land
rights by means of a discrete choice model. Estimations are conducted with and
without household ￿xed e⁄ects.9 A number of variables describing the mode of
acquisition of each farm (purchased, appropriated, gifted, etc.) and the number
of years since the acquisition are used as instrumental variables for property rights.
The results for Wassa indicate that land rights do in￿ uence investment: better rights
signi￿cantly raise the probability of land investments. The results for Anloga are
less robust, but still broadly in line with the theory.
Extensions attempt to assess which of the channels previously listed drive this
relationship. In such extensions, the author makes use of the disaggregated de￿nition
of household rights. Being allowed to use a particular ￿eld as collateral does not
necessarily imply that the investments will occur in that speci￿c ￿eld. Thus, if
the relationship between investments and land rights were driven by the e⁄ects
of property rights on access to credit markets, investments should be related to
rights enjoyed in all ￿elds, rather than ￿eld-speci￿c rights. Next, under the gains-
from-trade argument, some land rights (such as the right to sell or rent the ￿eld)
should have a greater impact on investments than other rights (such as the right to
mortgage, for instance). The empirical results do not strongly support any of these
two particular theoretical views.
Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak, J.P.E., 2002
In the late seventies, there was a major change in property rights in West Ben-
gal, India, due to a reform of tenancy laws known as Operation Barga. The reform,
carried out by a newly elected left-wing administration, increased tenants￿bargain-
ing power and secured land tenure. The election of this new administration in West
Bengal is interpreted by the authors as a national response to the party in power,
9Household ￿xed e⁄ects account for farmer heterogeneity, but rule out the identi￿cation of e⁄ects
that depend on the average rights (as in the collateral-based theory).
12which had ruled India since its independence, rather than a local particularity. Op-
eration Barga is thus interpreted as an exogenous change in property rights and
used to examine the relationship between tenancy laws and e¢ ciency.
The paper ￿rst develops a theoretical approach to the landlord-tenant relation-
ship based on moral hazard and limited wealth of tenants, which is used to analyze
the potential e⁄ects of the reform on contractual relationships. The reform increased
tenants￿reservation utility, since they could not be evicted by the landlord anymore
and could choose to retain the share of the output accorded before the reform. Due
to limited liability, a higher outside option increases the optimal share rate retained
by the tenant. The authors present evidence showing that the incentive power of
tenancy contracts has in fact increased after the reform. Greater tenure security and
a higher share rate induce the tenant to increase the supply of e⁄ort and noncon-
tractible land-speci￿c investments. On the other hand, after the reform the landlord
loses the possibility of using the threat of eviction as a credible incentive device.
The e⁄ect of Operation Barga on productivity was estimated using two ap-
proaches. The ￿rst is a quasi-experiment that uses Bangladesh as a control. The
authors argue that Bangladesh may be used as a control because: (i) it did not
introduce tenancy reform; (ii) it is very similar to West Bengal in terms of agro-
climatic conditions, prevalence of tenancy, and agricultural technology; (iii) it had
growth rates similar to West Bengal during the period before the reform. The second
approach compares the productivity growth in districts in which Operation Barga
was implemented intensively to districts in which the implementation was less in-
tensive.10 The results from both approaches indicate a positive impact of Operation
Barga on sharecropping productivity.
It is worth stressing that the productivity increase that followed the land reform
in West Bengal is due to a combination of two e⁄ects: tenure stability and higher
incentive power. Hence, this paper is also related to the discussion in Section 2.1.
Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle, A.E.R., 2002
This study is based on a survey conducted by the World Bank containing infor-
mation on 3,113 plots of 727 households from 31 villages in the Northeast region
of China in 1995. Unlike other papers in the literature, risk of expropriation is not
measured in this paper by land rights or tenure status. Instead, the authors estimate
a hazard model and predict the risk of expropriation associated with each land. This
predicted hazard of expropriation is then shown to be positively correlated to the
use of organic fertilizers (which has long-term impact on soil quality). The same
result is not found for the use of chemical fertilizers (whose e⁄ects on soil quality
do not last for long) and for maintenance investments.
10Intensity is measured by the number of sharecroppers who registered with the Department of
Land Revenue (a necessary condition for the tenant to be entitled to permanent and inheritable
land tenure).
13Manyong and HoundØkon, Mimeo, 2000
In 1987, a group of international institutions introduced a new land-improving
technology to the farmers of Benin Republic (in West Africa). Using data collected
six years later, Manyong and HoundØkon (2000) identify land tenure as an important
element explaining the adoption of this technology on di⁄erent farms.
Jacoby and Mansuri, Mimeo, 2003
Using data from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey completed in 2001, Jacoby
and Mansuri (2003) study whether farmers tend to invest more in their own lands
than in the lands they lease (under sharecropping and ￿xed rent). Land-speci￿c
investment is measured by the amount of farmyard manure (FYM) used per acre
cultivated during the year. The authors argue that: (i) FYM improves land quality
and its e⁄ects last for many seasons; (ii) FYM is not portable once incorporated
into the soil; (iii) FYM is usually collected as a byproduct of farmers￿own livestock
and manuring is very labor intensive. Thus, under imperfect monitoring, farmyard
manure could be interpreted as a noncontractible land-speci￿c investment.
The database contains a subsample of mixed tenants (i.e., households that cul-
tivate both owned and leased lands). This feature makes it possible to compare
investment behaviors across plots of the same household, avoiding potential biases
caused by unobserved characteristics of the tenant. In addition to this, one must
also worry about selection bias caused by soil-quality heterogeneity. The authors
use information about the landlord (such as total landholdings and tractor owner-
ship) as instruments for the leasing decision. These instrumental variables capture
characteristics of the landlord that are correlated to the leasing decision. Moreover,
if the landlords did not interfere in the investments made in their leased lands, these
variables would also be uncorrelated to unobserved aspects of FYM investments (the
dependent variable). The results indicate that FYM investments are lower on leased
(as opposed to owned) lands cultivated by the same household, which supports the
existence of a holdup problem.
Bandiera, Mimeo, 2004
Cultivation of trees in combination with regular crops is costly, but preserves
soil fertility and reduces soil erosion (a bene￿t not fully appropriated by untenured
tenants). Using household data from the 1998 Nicaragua Living Standards Mea-
surement Survey, Bandiera (2004) analyzes the choice of farmers who may or may
not grow trees.
A subsample of farmers who own and rent di⁄erent plots is used to control for
non-random heterogeneity in household characteristics. Since land characteristics
are not available, three di⁄erent strategies are used to address potential selection bias
due to land-quality heterogeneity. First, the opportunity cost of the land (reported
by owner and tenant farmers) is used as a proxy variable for land quality. Second,
subsamples of geographically close farms (among which the soil type could be more
14similar) are analyzed. Third, the author introduces a control variable indicating
whether a particular owned farm was originally acquired via land reform (rather
than through purchase or inheritance). Owned lands acquired via land reform were
originally leased before the reform, being thus similar to currently leased farms.
The results indicate that owned lands are more likely to have trees together with
annual crops. The tenant￿ s wealth is not a signi￿cant determinant of tree cultivation,
which suggests that limited liability and risk sharing are not crucial aspects of the
problem. Since wealth is endogenous, the value of the house and the number of
bedrooms are used as instruments.
2.3 Comments and Perspectives on Resource Allocation
Our understanding about the e⁄ects of di⁄erent contractual elements on resource
allocation has considerably improved in the last decade. Yet de￿nitive conclusions
are far from being reached. Conclusive experiments, in the molds of natural sci-
ences, are di¢ cult to be implemented and the existing empirical tests are based
on market data. Hence, the contracts studied are endogenously designed and their
observed characteristics (incentive power and length) are probably related to unob-
served characteristics of landlords, tenants, lands, crops, and other features of the
environment (such as taxes, laws, traditions, etc.).
The empirical literature in the last decade has attempted to develop di⁄erent
techniques to deal with selection and endogeneity issues. The paper by Rao (1971),
discussed in Section 2.1, does not account for endogeneity issues, while Shaban
(1987) uses tenants who simultaneously cultivate multiple plots under di⁄erent con-
tracts to account for endogenous heterogeneity in household characteristics. The
paper by La⁄ont and Matoussi (1995) uses the method of instrumental variable to
deal with all types of endogeneity problems (such as heterogeneity in landlord and
tenant characteristics, land quality, and institutions). The di¢ culty of this method
is that it strongly relies on the quality of the instrument (a variable that must be
correlated to the contract design and not related to any unobserved feature a⁄ecting
the dependent variable). A truly exogenous instrumental variable is often di¢ cult
to be found. Braido (2004a) uses the economic theory to derive a testable prediction
that is free of endogeneity considerations￿ instead of comparing the amount of in-
puts used, this paper compares the marginal productivity of each input across lands
cultivated by owners, ￿xed-rent tenants, and sharecroppers. This type of structural
test, however, depends on parametric assumptions on the production function. In
fact, there is an intense debate in economics regarding the use of reduced form mod-
els estimated by instrumental variables versus the use of tests based on structural
economic models.
The literature discussed in Section 2.2 essentially relies on instrumental variables
to deal with the endogeneity problem. Hence, the validity of those analyses depends
on the quality of the instruments used. A remarkable case is found in Banerjee,
15Gertler, and Ghatak (2002), where a quasi-experiment is constructed from an ex-
ogenous reform of tenancy laws. As with experiments in the natural sciences, this
quasi-experiment uses exogenous treatment and control groups to test a certain the-
oretical prediction, but this type of quasi-experiment is not replicable and does not
allow the researcher to control the variables to be exogenously changed.
Increasing our capability to deal with selection issues, with a special focus on
replicability, is certainly an important goal for future research. Creative identi￿ca-
tion strategies coupled with the development of new data surveys are likely to be
the key elements in this process.
3 Contract Design
This section reviews the debate on the designs of tenancy contracts. The two
main characteristics of tenancy contracts are, again, incentive power and length.
The literature however has mainly focused on the former, and Bandiera (2003) is
the only paper discussed here that explicitly addresses the latter issue.
Regarding incentive power, there are three di⁄erent classes of arguments com-
monly used to explain it. First, agency theory (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987)
stresses the trade-o⁄ between incentives and risk. Holding tenants￿risk aversion
constant, high-powered contracts are more likely to be used in ￿elds with low ex-
ogenous risk. On the other hand, delegation theory (see Rao, 1971 and Predengast,
2002) predicts exactly the opposite: since the scope for entrepreneurship is higher
in high-risk ￿elds, incentives are also more important in these farms. Finally, argu-
ments based on transaction costs predict that crops with lower costs for monitoring
e⁄ort and for measuring the inputs and the ￿nal output are more likely to be rented
under sharecropping.
The review starts with the part of Rao (1971) that was purposely omitted in
Section 2. Rao ￿nds a positive association between farm risk and incentive power,
supporting the delegation theory. Next, three papers on transaction costs are dis-
cussed: Ho⁄man (1984) suggests that vine plots are usually rented under share-
cropping due to lower costs of monitoring the tenant; Allen and Lueck (1992) stress
aspects related to soil exploitation and costs of measuring the ￿nal output as im-
portant in explaining tenancy contracts; and Allen and Lueck (1993) extend this
analysis to explain the share rate for input costs in sharecropping contracts. Next,
I discuss a small part of La⁄ont and Matoussi (1995) showing that the contractual
incentive power is a⁄ected by the tenant￿ s working capital but not by the tenant￿ s
wealth￿ emphasizing the relative importance of ￿nancial constraints over insurance
motives to explain contract designs. Allen and Lueck (1999) also present evidence
against the risk-sharing theory of sharecropping. Unlike these ￿ndings, Ackerberg
and Botticini (2002) ￿nd that the contract power is positively a⁄ected by the ten-
ant￿ s wealth in Renaissance Tuscany. Dubois (2002) studies how share contracts
16dynamically balance risk-sharing, e⁄ort incentives, and incentives for land-quality
maintenance. Chaudhuri and Maitra (2002) provide further evidence that landown-
ers tend to personally cultivate their most valued plots. Finally, some recent work-
ing papers by Canjels (1998a), Pandey (2001), Dubois (2001), Bandiera (2003), and
Braido (2004b) are presented.
Rao, J.P.E., 1971 ￿ Part II
Let us examine now the part of Rao￿ s (1971) paper related to contract design.
The argument developed by the author is based on the idea that tenants perform a
variety of di⁄erent entrepreneurial functions. Fixed-rent contracts permit the tenant
to capture the returns associated with decision making and protect the landlord
against possible risk arising from the production decisions of the tenant. Hence,
these contracts should be observed in environments with high risk and signi￿cant
scope for entrepreneurship. On the other hand, in low-risk scenarios, where the
scope for entrepreneurial decisions is restricted, sharecropping arrangements insure
tenants against risk.
This theory is tested against data from the Studies in Economics of Farm Man-
agement collected by the Government of India in three di⁄erent years, 1957-58,
1958-59, and 1959-60, in seven villages of the rice zone and three of the tobacco
zone. Sharecropping and ￿xed rent coexist in the villages studied, the former being
predominant in the rice zone and the latter being more common in the tobacco
zone. The estimated variance of pro￿ts is much higher for the tobacco zone (where
￿xed rent is predominant) than for the rice zone (where sharecropping is predomi-
nant). Furthermore, irrigation pattern, variation in rainfall, and variation in prices
also suggest tobacco as a riskier crop than rice. Hence, scope for entrepreneurship
rather than risk sharing is viewed as the key element explaining the design of share
contracts.
Ho⁄man, J. Econ. History, 1984
In this work, the author argues that, due to costs of supervising the tenant,
landlords are more likely to lease distant lands under higher-powered contracts.
Moreover, crops requiring a close landlord are more likely to be rented under lower-
powered contracts. These predictions are tested against historical data from 83
contracts, dated between 1533-1633 in France.
Logit estimations show that distant lands are more likely to be rented under
￿xed rent relative to sharecropping, and to sharecropping relative to wage labor
(con￿rming the ￿rst theoretical prediction). Moreover, vines are more likely to
use wage labor than tenancy and, among the ￿elds leased, sharecropping is more
common than ￿xed rent. The author argues that vines require present landlords
regardless of the tenancy contract. Considerable damage could be caused if the
tenant neglected buildings and fences. Moreover, by cutting the vines very short,
one increases return in that season at the cost of reducing productivity thereafter.
17Hence, the cost of monitoring other farming activities is signi￿cantly lower in vines
and the fact that these lands are leased under lower-powered contracts supports the
second theoretical prediction.
Allen and Lueck, J. Law & Econ., 1992
Due to insecurity of tenure, tenants have incentives to overuse the land. Share-
cropping alleviates this distortion relative to ￿xed rent because sharing the output
reduces the tenant￿ s gains in overusing the land. However, in order to implement
share contracts, the landlord must incur the costs of measuring the ￿nal output.
This is the basic trade-o⁄studied by Allen and Lueck (1992). Under this theory,
sharecropping is expected to occur in environments with high possibilities for soil
exploitation and where the cost of dividing the output is low. The authors test this
prediction using a sample with 3,432 leasing contracts from the 1986 Nebraska and
South Dakota Leasing Survey. Measurement costs are proxied by the type of crop
cultivated. Hay crops are more di¢ cult to measure, since they are typically sold
through private sales in contrast to other cultures that are publicly sold at local
markets. Scope for soil exploitation is measured by proximity to urban areas and
presence of irrigation. Proximity to urban areas provides alternative uses for the
land, making concerns about soil exploitation less important. Irrigation makes soil
exploitation less likely. Thus, proximity to urban areas and irrigation should be
positively correlated to ￿xed rent.
A logit analysis is conducted and the results support the underlying theory. In
addition, the authors ￿nd that sharecropping is positively related to corn and wheat.
Since corn is a crop with high pro￿t variability and wheat is a low-risk culture, the
author argues that this evidence does not support the risk-sharing motives commonly
associated with sharecropping.
Allen and Lueck, RAND, 1993
Here, the analysis of the previous paper is extended to understand not only the
share rate used to divide output, but also the share of input costs borne by the land-
lord. Agricultural production depends on land and productive inputs. Assuming a
production function that is separable in each factor, ￿xed rent induces proper use of
inputs. However, since the opportunity cost of using the land is typically lower for
untenured tenants as opposed to owners, ￿xed-rent contracts induce land overuse.
Sharecropping, on the other hand, alleviates the incentives for land overuse, but im-
plies costs of measuring the output. Share contracts also distort incentives for the
proper use of other inputs, but this could be solved by sharing input costs between
landlords and tenants at the same rate used to share the output.
In this setting, one should expect sharecropping to be associated with lower costs
of measuring output and high possibilities for soil exploitation. Moreover, for easily
measured inputs, sharecropping landlords would share costs at a rate equal to the
crop-share rate. Finally, ￿xed-rent contracts would be associated with environments
18with few possibilities for soil exploitation and high measurement costs.
These predictions are tested using data from the 1986 Nebraska and South
Dakota Land Leasing Survey. Evidence shows that, in general, tenants either bear
input costs alone or share them with the landlord at the same rate as the output
share. Tenants retain a higher share of the output when they bear input costs alone.
Moreover, logit estimates show that inputs purchased in the market are more
likely to be shared than those provided by the farmer (i.e., those harder to measure).
The probability of having an input being shared is negatively a⁄ected by the land￿ s
value, which proxies for scope of soil exploitation, and by the fraction of the total
area cropped under the current contract￿ the more lands from the same landlord,
the lower the tenant￿ s ability to shirk on the use of shared inputs.
La⁄ont and Matoussi, Rev. Econ. Stud., 1995 ￿ Part II
This paper has multiple aims, some of them already discussed in Section 1. Here,
I focus on a small part of it (pp. 395-397), which uses an ordered probit model to
study the selection of contracts. Evidence from El Oulja, in Tunisia, shows that
incentive power is negatively related to the landlord￿ s working capital, positively
related to the tenant￿ s working capital, and not signi￿cantly related to the tenant￿ s
wealth. The authors conclude that ￿nancial constraints are more important than
risk aversion in explaining the design of tenancy contracts.
Allen and Lueck, J.L.E.O., 1999
Allen and Lueck (1999) use four di⁄erent land-leasing surveys (from Nebraska,
South Dakota, British Columbia, and Louisiana) to test the relationship between
risk and incentive power. They have data on the form of the tenancy contract (￿xed
rent versus sharecropping) and the fraction of crop retained by the sharecropping
tenant. Exogenous risk is measured by the variability of crop yield across plots of a
certain region. A logit analysis shows that risk does not have a positive impact on
the probability of a crop being leased under sharecropping. Tobit regressions also
indicate that, in general, the tenant￿ s share rate does not decrease with risk.
Ackerberg and Botticini, J.P.E., 2002
The possibility of endogenous matching between landlords￿and tenants￿unob-
servable characteristics is addressed in this paper, by means of a historical data set
from Renaissance Tuscany. Endogenous matching happens when there are reasons
leading landlords and tenants to contract with each other. For instance, if tenants
were heterogeneous in their level of risk aversion and plots di⁄ered in their level
of riskiness, it could possibly be the case that less risk-averse tenants match with
more risky plots. Since the rule governing the matches is unknown, using proxies
for tenants￿risk aversion and plot risk is not enough to account for the endogeneity
bias.
The paper uses geographical-based instruments to account for the endogeneity
bias. The underlying assumption is that exogenous di⁄erences across regions a⁄ect
19the matching between tenants and landlords, without a⁄ecting the contract design
(the dependent variable) through other channels. Once this matching is taken into
account, the authors ￿nd a positive correlation between the contract share and the
tenant￿ s wealth. Assuming that wealth is a proxy for risk aversion, this evidence
supports insurance motives for share contracts.
Dubois, J.D.E., 2002
This paper develops a dynamic principal-agent model for agricultural tenancy
where the optimal contract design balances risk sharing, e⁄ort incentives, and con-
cerns about land-quality maintenance. In the model, land fertility is noncontractible
and evolves over time. Moreover, contracts expire at the end of each season and
long-term contracts are not enforceable.
The author derives testable predictions that relate contract choice and land
value in environments where production e⁄ort can reduce land fertility due to land
overuse. The analysis is implemented using data from rural areas of the Philippines,
collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute (Washington) and the
Research Institute for Mindanao Culture (Xavier University, Philippines).
Results reject the pure risk sharing model and the pure transaction costs ap-
proach. The trade-o⁄ between productivity and land-quality maintenance is sup-
ported by the data. Non-parametric estimation shows that the probability of leasing
out a plot is inverse U-shaped with respect to the land￿ s value. Among the leased
plots, landlords choose more incentive-powered contracts for more valuable plots
and for cropping patterns that are less likely to induce land overuse.
Chaudhuri and Maitra, Economica, 2002
This paper uses ICRISAT data from India and ￿nds that the probability of a
land being leased out to a tenant decreases with its value. Among the tenants,
sharecropping is positively correlated to the plot￿ s value.
Canjel, Mimeo, 1998a
This work uses a panel from the 1998 Agricultural Economics and Land Own-
ership Survey in the USA to construct regional measures for the yield risk due to
weather variation. It shows that the likelihood of a plot being under a share contract
is positively related to this measure of risk.
Pandey, Mimeo, 2001
The e⁄ects of technology on the design of share contracts are studied by means
of a database collected by the author in 1996 and 1998 in four villages of North
India. The sample contains plot-level data on output and inputs of 270 randomly
selected plots cultivated under sharecropping and ownership. The design of share
contracts varies across villages in terms of the share of the output received by the
tenant, the share of costs borne by them, and whether the contract was repeated
from one period to the next.
20The author constructs di⁄erent measures of noise, based on the standard devi-
ation of the error term in a linear regression of output on di⁄erent regressors (such
as plot characteristics and dummy variables for the tenancy contract, year, village,
and crop). Risk aversion is proxied by the tenant￿ s caste. The author ￿nds that
the probability of having a share contract repeated from one period to the next is
negatively related to the output noise. Moreover, sharecroppers￿rewards are lower
powered when the output is noisier.
Dubois, Mimeo, 2001
This paper uses data from Pakistan to assess the risk-sharing properties of house-
hold consumption. A structural model for the households￿preferences is used to
construct the coe¢ cients of absolute risk aversion. The author shows that more risk
averse households are more likely to sign contracts with lower incentive power.
Bandiera, Mimeo, 2003
This article studies the determinants of the design of tenancy contracts (incentive
power and length), by means of a historical data set containing information on the
characteristics of tenants, landlords, and crops of 705 tenancy contracts written
between 1870 and 1880 in the district of Syracuse, Italy.
The empirical results indicate that: (i) the tenant￿ s wealth is positively related
to long-term and ￿xed-rent contracts; (ii) female and aristocratic landlords (with
high monitoring costs) tend to lease their lands under long-term and ￿xed-rent
contracts; (iii) the most maintenance intensive crops tend to be leased under long-
term contracts, combined with either sharecropping (for poor tenants) or ￿xed rent
(for rich tenants).
This work is important for studying di⁄erent elements of tenancy contracts,
instead of focusing exclusively on their incentive-power dimension.
Braido, Mimeo, 2004b
Two of the main di¢ culties in testing the relationship between risk and incentive
power are that: (i) measures of risk based on output variability are usually a⁄ected
by the farmer￿ s actions, and (ii) risk aversion is heterogeneous across farmers. Braido
(2004b) uses data from the ICRISAT￿ s Village Level Studies in India to address these
issues.
Exogenous risk is measured by the variability of the error term of a stochas-
tic Cobb-Douglas production function. This measure of risk controls for variability
caused by endogenously chosen inputs, cropping pattern, irrigation, and cropped
area, among other factors. Plot ￿xed e⁄ects were also introduced in these estima-
tions, exploring the panel nature of the data.
Once a metric for exogenous risk is constructed, the paper tests the risk-incentive
relationship. Risk-aversion heterogeneity is taken into account by means of farmers
who simultaneously own and sharecrop di⁄erent plots in a same period. Holding
21the farmer code and period of time constant, the owned farms are riskier than the
sharecropped lands. This evidence does not support the risk-sharing argument for
sharecropping.
3.1 Comments and Perspectives on Contract Design
The literature on contract design tests the predictions derived from theoretical
models of market equilibrium. If the model indeed captured all relevant aspects
of the problem, there should be no special concern about selection issues (selection
would be part of the equilibrium prediction). However, the multiple features a⁄ect-
ing the contract design are not easily incorporated into a parsimonious model. This
fact leads many authors to focus on particular aspects of the contracting problem
and use the available techniques to control for heterogeneity in the other dimensions
of the problem.
Ignoring the contract length dimension of the problem is a common feature in
most of the papers discussed (exceptions include La⁄ont and Matoussi, 1995, and
Bandiera, 2003). This is mainly due to the fact that most databases do not have
information about the length of each contract. Moreover, many of the existing
theoretical results are based on static models, and there is no conclusive theory
about how contract length and incentive power interact in a dynamic environment.
While the development of new empirical methods is central in the literature
discussed in Section 2, the research agenda on contract design might tend to focus
on the development of new testable predictions that are robust to the di⁄erent
features of the contracting environment. New data, with more detailed information
on the contract design and on the environment, are also likely to be crucial for future
research.
4 Final Remarks and Policy Implications
The insurance literature has seen numerous theoretical contributions, whose pre-
dictions have been tested against data from many di⁄erent markets. Sharecropping
is regarded as a classic example of insurance and this essay has discussed some
papers studying the impact of di⁄erent contractual characteristics on resource al-
location, and other papers testing di⁄erent theories used to explain the design of
land-leasing contracts. This ￿nal section is intended to brie￿ y comment on some of
the policy implications derived from these papers.
The studies presented in Section 2.1 discuss whether the lower incentive power
of share contracts distorts the allocation of input resources. The evidence presented
by most of the literature suggests that share contracts induce lower productivity,
but considering the arguments in Braido (2004a), one may still have doubts on this
issue. This debate, however, generates no particular policy implication. Even if
share contracts did induce lower productivity, they could still be necessary to solve
22the trade-o⁄ between incentives and risk sharing (see Stiglitz, 1974) or to mitigate
soil exploitation (see Allen and Lueck, 1992 and 1993). A di⁄erent conclusion would
follow if share contracts were determined by other market imperfections, as analyzed
in Section 3.
Section 2.2 suggests that land investments made by tenants are a⁄ected by tenure
insecurity (through fear of expropriation). There is a relative consensus among
economists that better-de￿ned property rights encourage investment decisions. It is
also widely believed that a reliable legal system (able to enforce contracts and to de-
￿ne property rights unambiguously) should positively impact land-leasing e¢ ciency.
Besides that, there are papers suggesting that better-de￿ned rights could also reduce
the amount of non-utilized lands (see Berry and Cline, 1979 and Assun￿ªo, 2002).
In some developing countries, landholding is used as store of value (due to capital
market imperfections). Fearing land reforms, some of these investors prefer to keep
the land unproductive instead of leasing it out to a tenant. Therefore, improving
the legal system to expand the set of feasible contracts can lead societies to more
e¢ cient allocations.
Finally, the discussion on the determinants of tenancy contracts is presented in
Section 3. Many authors suggest that contract designs are determined by market
imperfections, such as transaction costs (e.g., Allen and Lueck, 1992 and 1993)
and credit-market imperfections (e.g., La⁄ont and Matoussi, 1995). In these cases,
policies reducing transaction cost and promoting the development of capital markets
would be desirable.
In closing this essay, it is worth stressing that microeconomic ine¢ ciencies have
been neglected for many years in the debate over public policy and economic devel-
opment. Recently, the growth theory has suggested that di⁄erences in total factor
productivity account for most of the income inequality across countries (see Par-
ente and Prescott, 2000). Microeconomic distortions, such as trade barriers, rent
seeking, market power,11 and informational asymmetries are among the variables
a⁄ecting a country￿ s productivity. Therefore, besides evaluating the relevance of
di⁄erent insurance theories, the empirical research on asymmetric information also
contributes to a broad agenda in public policy and development economics.
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